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Numerous studies have investigated whether music can reliably convey emotions to
listeners, and—if so—what musical parameters might carry this information. Far less
attention has been devoted to the actual contents of the communicative process. The goal
of this article is thus to consider what types of emotional content are possible to convey
in music. I will argue that the content is mainly constrained by the type of coding involved,
and that distinct types of content are related to different types of coding. Based on these
premises, I suggest a conceptualization in terms of “multiple layers” of musical expression
of emotions. The “core” layer is constituted by iconically-coded basic emotions. I attempt
to clarify the meaning of this concept, dispel the myths that surround it, and provide
examples of how it can be heuristic in explaining findings in this domain. However, I
also propose that this “core” layer may be extended, qualified, and even modified by
additional layers of expression that involve intrinsic and associative coding. These layers
enable listeners to perceive more complex emotions—though the expressions are less
cross-culturally invariant and more dependent on the social context and/or the individual
listener. This multiple-layer conceptualization of expression in music can help to explain
both similarities and differences between vocal and musical expression of emotions.
Keywords: music, emotion, expression, communication, categories, dimensions
INTRODUCTION
Few scholars would dispute that music is often heard as expressive
of emotions by listeners. Indeed, emotional expression has been
regarded as one of the most important criteria for the aesthetic
value of music (Juslin, 2013). Music has even been described as
a “language of the emotions” by some authors (Cooke, 1959). It
is not surprising, then, that a number of studies have investigated
whether music can reliably convey emotions to listeners, and—
if so—what musical features may carry this information. Far less
attention has been devoted to the actual contents of the commu-
nicative process. The goal of this article is thus to take a closer
look at the emotional contents of music. To be clear, the focus is
on the expression and perception of emotions, rather than on the
arousal of emotions (Gabrielsson, 2002).
In one sense, the term “emotional expression” is slightly mis-
leading: it is only sometimes that musicians are truly expressing
their own emotions in a composition or performance. What is
usually meant by the term emotional expression is that listen-
ers perceive emotional meaning in music. Yet the term “emotional
expression” is widely established and will thus be retained in the
present essay. The fact that people like to use the term “expres-
sion” suggests that music somehow reminds them of the ways
humans express their states of mind in real life—a notion that
is not too far off the mark (see section Iconic Coding: Basic
Emotions).
Whereas Budd (1985) defined music as “the art of unin-
terpreted sounds” (p. ix), the present author instead assumes
that music is constantly interpreted. Sometimes these interpreta-
tions may lead to the arousal of an emotion (e.g., Juslin, 2013).
But more commonly, perhaps, we merely detect meaningful
information. The notion of meaning suggests that music some-
how refers to something else, beyond itself (Cross and Tolbert,
2009), but what kind of meaning it conveys has been a matter
of much debate. Throughout history, music has been regarded as
expressive of motion, tension, human characters, identity, beauty,
religious faith, and social conditions. However, the most common
hypothesis is arguably that listeners perceive music as expressive
of emotions (for a review, see Gabrielsson and Juslin, 2003).
Empirical research largely confirms this view; for example, in
a survey study by Juslin and Laukka (2004), 141 participants were
asked what, if anything, music expresses. They were required to
tick items from a list of options, based on a thorough survey of
the literature on expression inmusic. Results indicated that “emo-
tions,” unlike any of the other options, was selected by 100%of the
participants. The real puzzle, however, and the topic of the present
discussion is this: which emotions are expressed in music and
why? The previous literature presents a somewhat confusing pic-
ture: some authors write about “expression” as something vague
and flexible, almost idiosyncratic; others seem to view expres-
sion as something more specific, something for which terms like
agreement and accuracy seem applicable. Are they really writing
about the same phenomenon? It is hoped that the present essay
can bring some clarity to this issue and illustrate how different
conceptions of expression might be related.
The rest of this article is organized as follows. First, I briefly
review some evidence regarding what emotions music typically
express. I also discuss which approach to emotion—categories
or dimensions—can best account for these results. Then, I argue
that the emotional content of music is constrained by three
types of coding that can be conceptualized as distinct “layers”
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of musical expression. Finally, I consider the implications of this
conceptualization for the field.
WHICH EMOTIONS DOES MUSIC EXPRESS?
Note that there are different senses in which music can be said
to express emotions. Firstly, a listener could perceive any emo-
tion in a piece of music; and in a nontrivial sense, it would
be inappropriate to claim that the listener is “wrong.” The sub-
jective impression of an individual listener cannot be disputed
on objective grounds. A first way to index emotional expres-
sion is thus to accept the unique impressions of individual lis-
teners: Whatever a listener perceives in the music is what the
music is expressing—for him or her at least! This is the view
adopted by MacDonald et al. (2012), when they note that “we
are . . . free to interpret what we hear in an infinite number of
ways” (p. 5).
Several researchers prefer a more “restrictive” view on expres-
sion, however, which holds that music is expressive of a specific
emotion only to the extent that there is some minimum level
of agreement among different listeners regarding the expression,
presumably because there is something in themusic that produces
a similar impression in many listeners. Expression thus conceived
brings a stronger focus on psychophysical relationships between
musical features and perceptual impressions. Thus, a second way
to index emotional expression in music is to focus on listener
agreement (Campbell, 1942).
The notion of expression does not require that there is any
correspondence between what the listener perceives in a piece of
music and what the composer or performer intends to express.
In contrast, the concept of “communication” requires that there
is both an intention to express a specific emotion and recogni-
tion of this emotion by listeners. Presumably, many musicians
care about whether listeners perceive their music the way they
intended it. Hence, if we study expressed emotions in terms of
communication, we might also index emotional expression in
terms of accuracy (Juslin and Timmers, 2010; see, e.g., Thompson
and Robitaille, 1992).
Most likely, there are fewer emotions for which there is agree-
ment among several listeners than there are emotions that a
single listener may perceive in a piece. Even fewer emotions
may be relevant if we consider those emotions that might be
reliably communicated from a musician to a listener; that is,
where there is an intention to convey an emotional charac-
ter, which is correctly recognized by a perceiver. Later in this
essay, I will offer a conceptualization that covers all of the above
ways in which music could be said to express emotions—from
the most personal to the most communal aspects of perceived
expression.
Just as there are many different ways to conceptualize expres-
sion in music, there are different approaches that may be adopted
to investigate empirically which emotions music can express. One
rather simple way to approach the question is to ask music listen-
ers directly. Thus, Table 1 shows data from three different studies
in which listeners were asked which emotions music can express.
In each study, the subject could choose from a long list of emo-
tion labels. Shown are the rank orders with which each of the
top ten emotion terms was selected. As can be seen, happiness,
Table 1 | Ratings of the extent to which specific emotions can be
expressed in music.
Kreutz (2000) Lindström
et al. (2003)
Juslin and
Laukka (2004)
Subjects 50 students 135 expert
musicians
141 volunteers
No. of
emotions
Subjects
32 38 38
RANK ORDERING
1. Happiness Joy Joy
2. Sadness Sadness Sadness
3. Desire Anxiety Love
4. Pain Love Calm
5. Unrest Calm Anger
6. Anger Tension Tenderness
7. Love Humour Longing
8. Loneliness Pain Solemnity
9. Fear Tenderness Anxiety
10. Despair Anger Hate
Only the ten most highly rated emotions in each study have been included in the
Table. Those emotion categories that correspond to the basic emotions are set
in bold text. (Anxiety belongs to the “fear family,” and tenderness to the “love”
family, see, e.g., Shaver et al., 1987.) The original lists of emotion terms con-
tained both “basic” and “complex” emotions, as well as some terms commonly
emphasized in musical contexts (e.g., solemnity).
sadness, anger, fear and love, tenderness were all among the top-
ten emotions, and this tendency was similar across the three
data sets, despite differences in samples (musicians vs. students,
various countries) and selections of emotion terms (ranging from
32 to 38 terms). Hence, there seems to be agreement about which
emotions are easiest to express in music1.
It could be argued that such findings are more reflective of the
beliefs and folk theories that musicians and listeners have about
music than they are of any real circumstances. However, evidence
that there is some substance to their intuitions comes from stud-
ies, where listeners are asked to rate the emotional expression of
actual pieces of music. The results from over a hundred studies
demonstrate that music listeners are generally consistent in their
judgments of expression. Thus, a second approach to answer what
emotions music expresses is to look at what emotions tend to
yield the highest levels of agreement between listeners in previous
studies. For instance, in their respective overviews, Gabrielsson
and Juslin (2003) and Juslin and Laukka (2003) noted that the
highest agreement between listeners occurred for emotions such
as happiness, sadness, anger, and tenderness, and emotion dimen-
sions, such as arousal. Moreover, there was often good agreement
regarding the broad emotional character, but less agreement about
nuances or variants of this emotion. Low agreement was found for
1Notably, the nine emotion clusters in Schubert’s (2003) “updated” version
of Hevner’s (1936) adjective clock are quite similar to the most highly ranked
emotion terms shown in Table 1.
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emotion labels such as jealousy, pity, cruelty, eroticism,whimsiness,
and devotion. In addition, hardly any agreement at all was found
for various events depicted in so-called “program music.”
In sum, previous research suggests that certain emotions are
easier to express in music than others. What approach can best
help to explain these findings? To answer this question, we first
have to review major approaches to conceptualizing emotions.
DOES MUSICAL EXPRESSION INVOLVE CATEGORIES OR
DIMENSIONS?
The dominant approaches to conceptualizing emotions in psy-
chology are categorical and dimensional approaches, respectively.
(I prefer to refer to them as approaches, rather than theories,
because they represent broad perspectives on similarities and
differences among emotions, which may include quite different
emotion theories of a more specific kind.)
CATEGORIES
According to categorical theories, people experience emotional
episodes as categories that are distinct from each other, such as
happiness, sadness, anger, surprise, fear, and interest (Izard, 1977).
Note that categorical theories of emotion come in many differ-
ent forms. Thus, one type of theory is associated with the concept
of basic emotions (see section The Concept of Basic Emotions).
However, many other emotion theories, such as component-
process theories and “music-specific” models, also involve cat-
egories and therefore represent subdivisions of the categorical
approach rather than additional approaches. Component-process
theories (e.g., Scherer, 1984) assume that there are as many cate-
gories as there are possible outcomes of the appraisal process. A
“music-specific” model assumes that the categories are different
from “everyday emotions,” and, moreover, that they are “unique”
to music. Zentner et al. (2008) proposed nine categories.
DIMENSIONS
In contrast, dimensional theories seek to conceptualize emo-
tions based on their approximate placement along broad
and continuous dimensions, such as valence, activation, and
potency. Just like categorical approaches, dimensional mod-
els come in several different forms—from one-dimensional
arousal models (Duffy, 1941), to two-dimensional (e.g., Arousal-
Pleasure, Russell, 1980; Positive Affect-Negative Affect; Watson and
Tellegen, 1985; Energetic Arousal-Tense Arousal; Thayer, 1989), or
three-dimensional models (Energy Arousal-Tense Arousal-Valence;
Schimmack and Grob, 2000; Gaiety-Gloom, Tension-Relaxation,
Solemnity-Triviality; Wedin, 1972). The most popular version is
clearly the circumplex model outlined by Russell (1980), maybe
because it is easy to understand. It consists of a two-dimensional
and circular structure featuring the dimensions pleasure and
arousal. The model illustrates that emotions vary in their degree
of similarity, and that some emotions are usually thought of as
opposites.
DISCRIMINATING EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE
Which of these approaches best accounts for emotions? Many
researchers view categorical and dimensional approaches as
“complementary” (Nyklícˇek et al., 1997): they both receive some
support from neurophysiological findings (Damasio, 1994), and
both can be useful to characterize emotions in music (e.g.,
Vieillard et al., 2008). Still, theoretically, they cannot really
be equally correct considering that they make opposite claims
at a fundamental level. Although several studies have aimed
to compare categorical and dimensional approaches to emo-
tions (e.g., Eerola and Vuoskoski, 2011), the data reported have
rarely any bearing on the fundamental assumptions of each
approach2. The most important difference between a dimensional
and a categorical approach is that the former assumes that emo-
tions vary in a continuousmanner in “emotion space,” whereas the
latter assumes that there is discontinuity (discreteness) in “emo-
tion space.” Though only few studies have directly addressed this
essential aspect, those studies that have indicate that the continu-
ity assumption is incorrect. That is, emotions show discreteness
in terms of category boundaries, rather than continuity (Haslam,
1995).
In this article, we are concerned with emotional expression. Of
particular importance in this context are studies which show that
continuous variation in vocal emotion expressions is processed
categorically (de Gelder and Vroomen, 1996; Laukka, 2005), since
there are strong parallels among vocal and musical expressions of
emotion (Juslin and Laukka, 2003; Table 7). If emotions conveyed
in sound are not perceived in a continuous fashion, then other
types of comparisons among the two approaches suddenly don’t
appear that important anymore—the dimensional approach has
already been found wanting.
It’s easy to see why categories are needed. Emotions function
to guide decisions about future behavior. A continuous dimen-
sion of, say, valence is all very nice—but how are you going to use
it? Exactly how much is enough to motivate a change in behav-
ior? We need a “cut-off” or “stop rule” to make a decision; and
once we have that—voilà—we have a category boundary. (In fact,
even the traditional pleasure or valence dimension of the circum-
plex seems to imply a discrete boundary at some point—between
positive and negative; approach and avoidance).
Categories are of crucial importance to human behavior:
they aid inferences, communication, and decision making (cf.
Markman and Rein, 2013). Hence, even Barrett (2006), a dimen-
sional theorist of rang, appears to have accepted that “core affect”
in terms of only two dimensions is insufficient to account for
human emotions. She postulates a conceptual layer of categories
of emotion on top of the two dimensions, and assumes that this
layer is a social construction that mainly reflects language. But can
emotion categories be dismissed so easily?
The argument that categorical perception of emotional expres-
sions reflects language is partly based on findings that categor-
ical perception involves a left-hemisphere bias in the brain. But
Holmes and Wolff (2012) reported that categorical perception is
2Eerola and Vuoskoski (2011) noted that although both discrete-emotions
and dimensional ratings of perceived emotions in music showed a high
internal consistency, the discrete-emotions model showed a somewhat lower
consistency for ambiguous examples of emotions (poor emotion examplars).
However, the dimensional model performs bettermainly because it ‘by-passes’
the task of allocating perceived emotions to an emotion category.
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not driven by language3; and emotion categories in vocal expres-
sion appear in other mammals, which obviously don’t have a
verbal language. For instance, the squirrel monkey has a lim-
ited number of vocal expression categories, which are associated
with important events in the monkeys’ life, such as warning calls
(alarm peeps), threat calls (groaning), desire for social contact
calls (isolation peeps) and companionship calls (cackling) (Ploog,
1992). Further, even in the first months of life, human infants
are able to differentiate vocal expressions of emotions in infant-
directed speech, and to respond adequately to their categorical
messages (see Papoušek et al., 1990). While I certainly do not
deny that language shapes several aspects of how we report—
and perhaps even experience—emotions, it cannot fully account
for the existence of discrete emotion categories. Panksepp (1998)
have outlined distinct emotion systems, with neuroanatomical
and neurochemical components in the mammal brain, associated
with seven emotion categories. His emotion labels (with more
commonly used labels within parentheses) are seeking (interest),
rage (anger), fear, lust (desire), care (tenderness), panic (sadness),
and play (joy). The point is that emotion categories go deeper
than mere verbal labels in language.
While there seems to be a consensus today that dimensional
approaches focus on subjective experience (feelings)—perhaps
because they are so poorly able to account for other emo-
tion components such as emotional expression—it is important
to acknowledge that dimensional models did not derive from
“raw data” of self-reported emotions. Instead, they were abstract
dimensions that resulted from multivariate statistical techniques
applied to similarity ratings of facial expressions and emotion
labels (e.g., Plutchik, 1994). People do not spontaneously report
emotions as coordinates within an abstract, multi-dimensional
emotion space. Hence, dimensionalmodels appear too reduction-
ist. In the circumplex model, two emotions that are placed in the
same position in the circular matrix may be very different. For
example, anger and fear are two emotions that are highly corre-
lated within this model because they are both high in arousal and
unpleasantness. Yet they are very different in terms of their impli-
cations for the organism (Lazarus, 1991). Furthermore, musical
expressions of the two emotions are quite different (see Juslin and
Laukka, 2003; Table 7). This implies that the circumplex model
cannot accommodate that we are able to distinguish anger and
fear expressions.
Based on the above line of reasoning, I conclude that musi-
cal expression of emotion is likely to involve emotion categories,
rather than mere dimensions. (As we shall see later, this does not
preclude that there is an implicit dimensionality in emotion cate-
gories; cf. section Resistance Against Basic Emotions) If emotions
tend to involve categories, then the next question is, which are
those categories? Below, I suggest that an ecological perspective
on emotions can be helpful to understand the kinds of categories
that have been premiered throughout evolution. But the types of
emotion that are expressed and recognized in music also reflect
3Bigand et al. (2005) also reported categorical effects that are unlikely to be
a by-product of linguistic labelling, in the context of emotion judgments of
music excerpts (p. 1130).
the precise process through which the emotional contents are
transmitted.
HOW DOES MUSIC EXPRESS EMOTIONS? THREE TYPES
OF CODING
To explain why music appears to be expressing some emotions,
rather than others, we need to take a closer look at the under-
lying process, particularly how the emotional meaning is coded
in music (the specific manner in which the music carries the
emotional meaning). I argue here that the emotional content of
musical expression is constrained by the type of coding available
and that distinct types of content are conveyed through different
types of coding. Dowling and Harwood (1986) offered a useful
categorization based on the ideas of Charles Pierce:
• Icon refers to a response based on formal similarity between
the music and some other signal, such as vocal expression or
human movement.
• Symbol refers to a response based on internal, syntactic rela-
tionships within the music itself.
• Index refers to a response due to an “arbitrary” association
between the music and some other event or object.
These three principles have been referred to as “iconic,” “intrin-
sic,” and “associative” sources ofmusical expression, in an attempt
to make the concepts easier to grasp (Sloboda and Juslin, 2001).
In the following, I will consider these types of coding in music
and their implications for the types of emotions expressed.
ICONIC CODING: BASIC EMOTIONS
A first and very powerful source of perceived emotion in music
reflects iconic coding. Juslin (1995, 1997, 1998, 2001) has repeat-
edly theorized that the code used in emotional expression in
music performance is based on innate and universal “affect pro-
grams” for vocal expression of emotions. According to this “func-
tionalist” framework—partly inspired by Spencer (1857)—the
origin of iconically-coded expressions is to be sought in involun-
tary and emotion-specific physiological changes associated with
emotional reactions, which strongly influence different aspects of
voice production (for a review of the relationships among emo-
tion, physiology and voice, see Juslin and Scherer, 2005). This
notion was later named “Spencer’s law” by Juslin and Laukka
(2003). Because of its evolutionary origin, this is the type of
coding that will have the most uniform impact on musical expres-
sion. I will show that iconically-coded expressions are intimately
related to basic emotions.
The concept of basic emotions
The term basic or discrete emotions occurs frequently in the
music psychology field today, typically to refer to certain emo-
tions (happiness, sadness, anger, and fear), but without any deeper
consideration of the theoretical basis of the concept. This is
unfortunate, as it serves to obscure many of the issues under
consideration.
First of all, it is quite possible to talk about emotions like sad-
ness, surprise, anger, happiness, interest, and fear without adopt-
ing a basic-emotions perspective. Thus, simply adopting these
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emotions does not itself make one a “basic-emotion theorist.”
(Otherwise, even Scherer would be a “basic-emotion theorist”
because most of his studies have focused on these emotions; e.g.,
Scherer and Oshinsky, 1977; Banse and Scherer, 1996; Scherer
et al., 2001). Hence, regardless of one’s theoretical position, sad-
ness, happiness, anger, surprise, and fear are obvious examples of
emotions from “everyday life.” Therefore, my recommendation is
to employ the term “basic emotion” only when one is embracing
the theoretical basis of this concept, and to use the term “everyday
emotions” when one is simply referring to emotions like happi-
ness, anger, surprise, fear, and sadness, without wanting to commit
to the underlying theory of basic emotions.
The concept of basic emotions refers to the idea that there is a
limited number of innate and universal emotion categories, which
are more biologically fundamental than others (Tomkins, 1962;
Izard, 1977; Ekman, 1992; Oatley, 1992; Plutchik, 1994; Power
and Dalgleish, 1997). Each basic emotion may be defined func-
tionally in terms of a key appraisal of goal-relevant situations that
have occurred frequently during evolution (e.g., Oatley, 1992).
The situations include cooperation, conflict, separation, danger,
reproduction, and caring. Support for basic emotions comes from
a wide range of sources that include:
• Phylogenetic continuity of basic emotions (Plutchik, 1980)
• Early development of proposed basic emotions (Harris, 1989)
• Distinct brain substrates associated with basic emotions
(Murphy et al., 2003)
• Distinct patterns of psychophysiological changes (Ekman et al.,
1983)
• Cross-cultural accuracy in facial and vocal expression
(Elfenbein and Ambady, 2002)
• Categorical perception of facial expressions of basic emotions
(Etcoff and Magee, 1992)
• Clusters matching basic emotions in similarity ratings of affect
terms (Shaver et al., 1987)
• Reduced reaction times in lexical-decision-tasks when prim-
ing words are taken from the same basic emotion category
(Conway and Bekerian, 1987)
Not all of these sources of evidence are equally strong: thus, for
example, the extent to which psychophysiological measures can
distinguish among basic emotions is controversial, though recent
multivariate approaches to emotion classification are promising
(e.g., Kragel and LaBar, 2013). Yet, the most impressive evidence
of basic emotions comes from studies of emotional communica-
tion (Juslin and Laukka, 2003).
Basic emotions in vocal and musical communication
To answer the question of which emotion categories we have, we
first need to ask ourselves why we have categories at all; and,
in particular, why we have emotion categories. Here, an ecolog-
ical perspective on emotion could be helpful. Categories enable
us to make important inferences (Corter and Gluck, 1992). For
example, the ability to predict the probable behavior of another
individual is quite useful: it allows the judge to adjust his or
her behavior in order to affect the outcome of the interaction.
Consequently I have argued elsewhere (Juslin, 1998) that when
it comes to communication of emotion, the basic emotion cate-
gories represent the optimal compromise between two opposing
goals of a perceiver: the desire to have the most informative cat-
egorization possible and the desire to have the categories be as
discriminable as possible (Ross and Spalding, 1994). To be useful
as guides to action, emotional expressions are typically decoded in
terms of a few emotion categories related to important life prob-
lems such as danger (fear), competition (anger), loss (sadness),
social cooperation (happiness), or caregiving (love) (Juslin, 2001).
In support, there is cross-cultural accuracy in decoding of
basic emotions in vocal expression even in so-called traditional
societies without any exposure to media (Bryan and Barrett,
2008). Critics of the basic-emotion approach in studies of vocal
expression (Bachorowski, 1999) like to point out that it has been
difficult to find distinct voice-profiles for basic emotions. Indeed,
although basic emotions do present different acoustic features
(Juslin and Laukka, 2003; Table 7), it’s clear that the acoustic pat-
terns obtained do not always neatly correspond to categories. But
to look for discrete categories in the acoustic data is to look at
the wrong place altogether. Categorical perception is a creation
of the mind, it’s not in the physical stimulus. The relevant sup-
port comes from work that shows that vocal emotion expression
is perceived categorically (Laukka, 2005). The argument is that
this evolved tendency to interpret emotional meaning in sounds
in terms of certain categories places some constraints on musical
expression also.
I have speculated (Juslin, 2001) that the origin of music lies
in ceremonies of the distant past that related vocal emotion
expression to singing: vocal expressions of basic emotions such
as happiness, sadness, anger and love probably became gradually
meshed with vocal music that accompanied associated cultural
activities, such as festivities, funerals, wars, and caregiving. The
implication is that basic emotions are “privileged,” in the sense
that they are biologically prepared for effective communication.
That basic emotions are easier to convey reliably in musical
expression is also partly an effect of the fact the communicative
process involves partly redundant cues which limits the amount of
information that may be conveyed through the “channel,” as cap-
tured by the LensModel for music and emotion first proposed and
implemented by Juslin (1995, 2000). This characteristic might
also be explained in terms of evolutionary pressures: Ultimately,
it is more important to avoid making serious mistakes (e.g., mis-
taking anger for joy), than to have the ability to make subtle
discriminations among emotions (e.g., reliably recognizing dif-
ferent types of joy). Thus, a listener’s interpretation of emotions
in music will tend to gravitate toward basic categories.
Resistance against basic emotions
As shown above there are plenty of reasons to adopt a categorical
approach in terms of basic emotions. Why, then, has the notion
of basic emotions been treated with so much skepticism in the
music field recently? The reasons may be different, depending on
who the skeptics are. Amongmusicians, there may be a sense that
the concept of basic emotions somehow implies a low level of
musical sophistication. (Who would like to have his or her music
compositions or performances described as “basic”?) As pointed
out by Juslin and Lindström, (2010), however, the term basic
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emotion does not imply that the music itself is “basic”: indeed,
“basic emotions may be expressed in the most sublime manner”
(p. 356). The term simply highlights the fact that basic emotions
are at the core of human emotions. (Moreover, for most theo-
rists, the idea of basic emotions also means that there are more
complex emotions; see section Beyond Basic Emotions: Intrinsic
and Associative Coding) Yet, one source of resistance to basic
emotions is probably the terminology as such.
One way to reduce resistance to the notion of basic emo-
tions amongst musicians could be to demonstrate their natural
relationships to the everyday praxis of musicians, even in clas-
sical music. Could it be the case that these terms used merely
as shorthand for broad categories of emotion in musical expres-
sion in previous studies (Juslin, 2001) can be “translated” to
some “language” more familiar to the working musician? Musical
scores often include “expression marks” that serve to indicate not
only the tempo of the music but also the intended expressive
character of the music. In a recent study (Juslin and Wiik, sub-
mitted), professional performers and psychology students were
required to rate a highly varied set of pieces of classical music
with regard to 20 expression marks rated as common by music
experts and 20 emotion terms rated as feasible in the context of
musical expression (e.g., Lindström et al., 2003).When the ratings
were combined, the analysis yielded highly significant correla-
tions among expression marks and emotion terms—in particular
for basic emotions (Table 2). The results may not be particularly
surprising, given that expression marks typically involve reference
to motion and emotion characters. But the point is that when
music psychologists talk about basic emotions, they may well be
referring to precisely the same expressive qualities that performers
consider in expression marks throughout their daily work. Again
we should not get too hung up on the superficial labels used to
refer to the underlying emotion categories4.
4Some musicians resist description of music in words more generally, on the
basis that language is incapable of capturing all the musical nuances, but this
limitation obviously applies to all emotion approaches discussed here.
Table 2 | Examples of correlations between commonly used
expression marks in music scores and basic-emotion labels used by
psychologists.
Expression mark Emotion label Correlation (r)
Dolce Tenderness 0.98*
Espressivo Desire 0.85*
Furioso Anger 0.92*
Disgust 0.79*
Grave Sadness 0.88*
Scherzando Happiness 0.76*
Spiritoso Surprise 0.94*
Temoroso Anxiety 0.97*
Fear 0.82*
*p < 0.01.
(based on Juslin and Wiik, submitted).
Among music researchers, resistance to basic emotions seems
to be due to certain myths that have been allowed to flourish
unchallenged, and that have contributed to a misunderstanding
of the concept of basic emotions. Six of thesemyths warrant closer
consideration here.
Myth 1: “There is no agreement aboutwhich emotions are basic.”
Basic emotions have been criticized, based on the fact that dif-
ferent emotion theorists have come up with different lists of
emotions (Ortony and Turner, 1990). But this argument is, on
reflection, a little suspect. There is a key question we should ask
about the concept of basic emotions: does the concept help to nar-
row down and organize the field of emotion in a way that makes
for greater agreement and consistency amongst those researchers
who adopt the concept than amongst those who don’t? If so,
the concept is heuristic. Note that ideas about emotions depend
crucially on how one defines an emotion. This helps to explain
differences with respect to the lists of basic emotions proposed so
far. How can we expect the authors to come up with the same set
of basic emotions if they don’t define emotions in the same way?
The relevant question to ask is therefore: is there agreement about
which emotions are basic amongst those who define emotions in a
similar way? In fact, if we consider the authors who adopt sim-
ilar definitions of emotions (e.g., in terms of their evolutionary
adaptiveness), there is a lot of agreement about which emotions
are basic (e.g., Plutchik, 1980). There is arguably more disagree-
ment about the term “emotion” itself than about basic emotions
(cf. Kleinginna and Kleinginna, 1981). Yet, few would argue that
we should abandon the term “emotion.”
Myth 2: “Basic-emotions are incompatible with appraisal the-
ory.” Sometimes the basic-emotion approach is contrasted with
“appraisal theories” (Scherer, 1984), which aim to describe the
processes through which an emotion is aroused. This is mislead-
ing, as it implies that the basic-emotion approach is somehow
incompatible with appraisal. In fact, it turns out that many
appraisal theorists embrace the notion of basic or primary emo-
tions (see Lazarus, 1991; Roseman, 1991; Stein and Trabasso,
1992). Appraisal is a fundamental aspect of emotion induction
that must be part of any emotion theory regardless of how it con-
ceptualizes the resulting emotions. A component-process theory
(e.g., Scherer, 1984) does not differ from a basic-emotion the-
ory because it involves appraisal: The primary difference between
the two types of theories is that the former assumes that there
are as many emotion categories as there are possible outcome
combinations of the appraisal-criteria included. (To my knowl-
edge, this essential assumption has never actually been tested and
verified by any researcher). The latter type, in contrast, assumes
that cognitive appraisals typically result in a fewer number of
broad categories, with more differentiated appraisals producing
nuances within the categories, rather than additional categories.
Regardless, basic-emotion theories are compatible with attempts
to model the appraisal process that produces an emotion5.
5However, recall that emotions can be aroused in many different ways (Izard,
1993; Juslin, 2013). Hence, there lies a danger in defining emotion categories
solely on the basis of specific appraisal outcomes.
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Myth 3: “Basic emotions are crude and lacking in nuance.”
This refers to the common view that emotion categories do
not allow for the occurrence of subtle nuances within a cate-
gory. This reflects a misunderstanding of the very concept of
a category. Just as there are different shades of blue, there can
be different shades of sadness. The notion of basic emotions
implies that, emotions from distinct basic-level categories are
more different from one another than are different emotions
from within the same category (e.g., sadness and joy differ more
than, say, sadness and melancholy); this doesn’t preclude that
there are nuances within categories as well. The notion of an
emotion category is nicely captured by the word “emotion fam-
ily” (e.g., Ekman, 1992). Each family includes a “theme” and
its “variations.” The “theme” represents the common character-
istics of the basic emotion and the “variations” all the subtle
nuances and shadings that might occur within the category.
Laukka and Juslin (2007) reported that listeners could accu-
rately recognize various intensity levels (high or low) of basic
emotions in both vocal and musical expressions. Hence, there’s
an implicit dimensionality within basic-level emotion categories.
Schubert (2010) points out that although we often think of
using continuous-response methodology only with respect to
dimensional models, it’s perfectly possible to collect continu-
ous ratings of discrete emotions also (e.g., to rate the amount
of sadness while the music unfolds). In addition, many emotion
researchers postulate “secondary” or “mixed” emotions which are
founded on basic emotions, but that involve “blends” of emotions
(Plutchik, 1994), or specific cognitive appraisals which occur
together with a basic emotion (Oatley, 1992). Hence, Johnson-
Laird and Oatley (1989) were able to sort several hundreds of
emotion terms into just five basic emotion categories or some
subset of them. Basic-emotion theories are able to accommo-
date diversity and nuances, including ebb and flow in emotion
over time.
Myth 4: “Basic emotions are always full-blown responses.” Basic
emotions are commonly depicted by critics in a stereotyped man-
ner, which borders on caricature: it’s usually about hair-raising
fear when confronted by a bear! But basic emotions may vary in
intensity (e.g., from frustration or irritation to anger and rage).
There is nothing in the concept of basic emotions as such that
requires that the emotion will always be intense. Basic emo-
tions are typically portrayed in such a way by critics in order
to make the emotions appear irrelevant in everyday life (or in
music). Are basic emotions relevant in everyday life? In the con-
text of vocal expression, Cowie et al. (1999) asked participants
to select a subset of emotions that they thought were impor-
tant in everyday life. This produced a list of 16 emotions and
labels chosen included basic emotions in different variants such
as anger, fear, happiness, sadness, love, worry, interest and affec-
tion (cf. Panksepp’s seven emotional systems): we feel irritated
when we can’t find a parking space; tender when our children
greet us; anxious when we receive letters from the tax office; or
enthusiastic when we get a paper accepted. The mere fact that
most emotions experienced in everyday life aren’t particularly
intense does not imply that they do not involve basic-emotion
categories6. Consider Plutchik’s (1994) cone model of basic emo-
tions (Figure 1). The circular arrangement shows the degree of
similarity among the emotions, whereas the vertical dimension
shows the intensity dimension. One consequence of this arrange-
ment is that emotions of a lower intensity are closer to each
other, and hence more similar, than are emotions of a high
intensity. It may be that music often operates in the lower sec-
tion of the cone, rather than in the extreme section representing
“full-blown emotions,” but the same emotion categories are still
involved. Therefore, we may not always “detect” discrete emo-
tions in everyday life situations or in musical expressions, simply
because milder versions of basic emotions involve more subtle
differences.
Myth 5: “Basic emotions are not relevant in music.” The above
myths can explain a further myth: that basic emotions are irrele-
vant in the context of musical expression. One moment’s reflec-
tion suggests the opposite—if there is any type of emotions that
could be expected to have a strong and natural link to musi-
cal expression, then it’s the basic-emotion type: basic emotions
can be conveyed nonverbally through gesture and tone of voice
using similar patterns (e.g., Clynes, 1977; Juslin, 1997), whereas
more complex emotions don’t have similarly distinct nonver-
bal patterns. We also saw that emotions that are regarded as
basic emotions (e.g., happiness, sadness, anger, tenderness, fear)
6Admittedly, many researchers prefer to look at intense emotions, but that’s
because it may be easier to detect effects of emotional responses on various
measures if one uses emotion episodes with a high intensity.
FIGURE 1 | Plutchik’s “cone model” of emotion (adapted from
Plutchik, 1994).
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seem easiest to express and perceive in music, as indexed by
listener agreement (Gabrielsson and Juslin, 2003) and ratings by
both musicians (Lindström et al., 2003) and listeners (Juslin and
Laukka, 2004). Zentner and Eerola (2010) submit that discrete-
emotion models were not developed to study music. This is of
course true, but in the context of perceived emotion, this misses
the greater point: that music probably evolved on the founda-
tion of vocal expressions of basic emotions. Hence, examples of
such basic emotions may easily be found also in commercially
available recorded music. For example, Leech-Wilkinson (2006)
offers a large number of examples of “expressive gestures” used by
singers to express basic emotions, such as fear, sadness, anger, love,
and disgust in Schubert Lieder (see also analysis by Spitzer, 2010).
Further, if we leave classical music aside for the moment—since it
is a minority interest in the world, and even in the Western world
(Hargreaves, 1986)—and look at the types of music most fre-
quently heard in everyday life, we find that popular music involves
songs about things that matter to people, the stuff that makes
them happy, sad, angry, afraid, or tender.
Myth 6: “Basic emotions have dominated in studies of music
and emotion.” This concerns the increasingly common claim that
basic or discrete emotions have somehow dominated in music
and emotion research. The actual data reveal something else.
Eerola and Vuoskoski (2013) recently reviewed studies of music
and emotion published over a ten-year period (from 1988 to
2009). They found that about one third of these studies adopted
a basic or discrete-emotions perspective. This shows, then, that
the majority of studies of music and emotion have not focused
on basic emotions. This is even more true, if one extends the
time-frame of the overview. For instance, Gabrielsson and Juslin
(2003), who reviewed studies of emotional expression in music
from the 1890’s, observed that the concept of basic emotions,
and other influences from emotion psychology in general, have
come into studies of musical expression quite recently, and then
primarily in studies of music performance. In most of the investi-
gations to date, the emotions measured have instead been chosen
based on statements from philosophers and music theorists; sug-
gestions from previous studies; and intuition, folk psychology,
and personal experience. All together, the emotion labels used in
previous work are counted in hundreds. Therefore, the view that
basic emotions have dominated in previous studies of music and
emotion is largely a “straw man”7.
A positive explanatory role of basic emotions
If we can get past the above myths about basic emotions, and
consider the concept on its own merits, we may find that it
can be highly heuristic to our understanding of musical expres-
sion. Few researchers in the music field have explicitly adopted
a basic-emotions approach (but see Clynes, 1977). I proposed
such an approach specifically in the context of studies of emo-
tional expression in the performance of music (and not as an
all-encompassing solution for the field of musical emotion),
7One exception is a set of studies of performance, which used the so-called
“standard paradigm” to investigate whether musicians can communicate
various basic emotions to listeners (reviewed by Juslin and Laukka, 2003).
because I thought the concept could uniquely help to account
for several of the findings in that field (see Juslin, 1997). The
findings that have amassed since then have only reinforced this
belief. Hence, consistent with the idea that emotional expres-
sion in music performance is mainly based on a code for vocal
expression of basic emotions that has served important functions
throughout evolution is evidence that:
• Basic emotions in vocal expressions can be recognized cross-
culturally, even in traditional cultures (Bryan and Barrett,
2008)
• Basic emotions in vocal expression are perceived categorically
(e.g., de Gelder and Vroomen, 1996; Laukka, 2005)
• It is notoriously difficult to “retrain” a participant so as to
express a specific basic emotion with a different expressive
pattern (Clynes, 1977, pp. 44–45)
• There are significant similarities between vocal expression and
musical expression of basic emotions (Juslin and Laukka, 2003;
Table 7)
• There is a similar pattern of age-related differences in recogni-
tion of emotions from vocal expression andmusic performance
(Laukka and Juslin, 2007; see also Lima and Castro, 2011)
• Congenitally amusic individuals (with deficits in processing
acoustic and structural attributes of music) are significantly
worse than matched controls at decoding basic emotions in
vocal expressions (Thompson et al., 2012)
• Basic emotions are easier to communicate than complex emo-
tions in music (Gabrielsson and Juslin, 1996; cf. Senju and
Ohgushi, 1987)
• Basic emotions in music can be recognized cross-culturally
(Fritz et al., 2009)
• Basic emotions in music show high cross-cultural agreement,
whereas non-basic emotions show low cross-cultural agree-
ment (Laukka et al., 2013)
• Basic emotions such as sorrow, anger, love, joy and fear are
explicitly part of many non-Western theories of musical emo-
tions (e.g., Becker, 2004, p. 58)
• Decoding of basic emotions inmusic is very quick (Peretz et al.,
1998; Bigand et al., 2005)
• Decoding of basic emotions in music does not require musical
training (e.g., Juslin, 1997; Vieillard et al., 2008)
• Expression of basic emotions inmusic does not require musical
training (Yamasaki, 2002)
• Even children (3 or 4 years old) are able to decode basic emo-
tions in music with better than chance accuracy (Cunningham
and Sterling, 1988; Terwogt and van Grinsven, 1991)
• Even children are be able to use voice-related cues to express
basic emotions in their songs (Adachi and Trehub, 1998)
• The ability to decode basic emotions in music performances is
correlated with measures of emotional intelligence (Resnicow
et al., 2004)
• There are cross-cultural similarities in cue utilization for fea-
tures shared between vocal expression and musical expression
(Balkwill and Thompson, 1999; Laukka et al., 2013)
• Decoding of basic emotions in music performances involves
many of the same brain regions as perception of basic emotions
in vocal expression (Escoffier et al., 2013)
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It is my strong belief that no other emotion approach can nearly as
convincingly account for the above findings regarding expression
of emotion in music performance. The dimensional approach
would have to explain why there is categorical perception of
emotional expression if emotions are processed as continuous
dimensions. It would also have to explain why some emotions
are more easily expressed and recognized than others, if all emo-
tions can be placed along the same continuous dimensions.
Component-process theories would have to show that there are
as many recognizable emotion categories in musical expression as
there are possible appraisal-combination outcomes. This is a tall
order, and I do not expect it to happen anytime soon. In contrast,
a basic-emotions approach (Juslin, 1998) predicts categorical per-
ception of emotions and higher listener agreement or decoding
accuracy for emotions such as happiness, sadness, anger, fear, and
tenderness.
BEYOND BASIC EMOTIONS: INTRINSIC AND ASSOCIATIVE CODING
The idea that basic emotions are “privileged” in musical expres-
sion does not imply, however, that other emotions cannot be
conveyed in music also. It seems possible for music to con-
vey more complex emotions under certain circumstances, even
though there will tend to be lower agreement between listeners
for such emotions (Senju and Ohgushi, 1987; Laukka et al., 2013).
Part of the reason for this tendency is that more complex emo-
tions are coded differently: they involve intrinsic and associative
coding.
Intrinsic coding
Intrinsic coding involves internal syntactic relationships within
the music itself. Music theory involves frequent references to
tonal or harmonic motion (Lerdahl and Krumhansl, 2007), even
gravitational forces between tones and chords (Larson and Van
Handel, 2005), which can create “tension,” “release,” “climax,”
“repose,” and “relaxation.” Although Meyer’s (1956) well-known
theory focused primarily on how the thwarting of musical expec-
tations might arouse emotion in listeners, it seems likely that
this internal play within the musical structure could also affect
perceived emotions (e.g., the emotional intensity; see Sloboda
and Lehmann, 2001; Timmers and Ashley, 2007, for examples).
Intrinsic sources of musical expression in music have rarely been
investigated thus far, but they are unlikely to express specific
emotions by themselves. Rather, their signification appears quite
broad and mainly helps to qualify specific emotions conveyed
by iconic or associative coding. By contributing dynamically
shifting levels of tension, arousal and stability, they may help
to express more complex, time-dependent emotions, such as
relief and hope. This type of coding may require longer music
excerpts in order to be truly effective, while most studies to
date have used relatively short excerpts (Eerola and Vuoskoski,
2013).
Associative coding
Finally, music might also be perceived as expressive of emotions
through associative coding. In other words, a performance of
music may be perceived as expressive of a specific emotion sim-
ply because something in the music (a melody, timbre) has been
repeatedly and arbitrarily paired with other meaningful stimuli
or events in the past. Organ music could be perceived as expres-
sive of “solemnity” or “spirituality,” simply because it has been
heard often in churches. Dowling and Harwood (1986) offered
a classic example, in terms of Puccini’s use of the first phrase
of the “Star Spangled Banner” in Madame Butterfly to signify a
feeling of “patriotism.” Associative coding plays a crucial part in
Wagner’s Leitmotif strategy, where specific melodic themes are
associated with particular characters in the drama. Included in
this coding subtype are also expressive meanings which are purely
conventional. Throughout music history, there are several exam-
ples of systems for emotional communication primarily based
on convention (e.g., “the doctrine of affections”; see Buelow,
1983). Through this type of coding, music may achieve a more
precise and complex expression, but its recognition will depend
on having the necessary knowledge or experience. Hence, emo-
tional expression through this type of coding will necessarily be
less cross-culturally invariant and more context and/or listener
dependent. Beyond a certain level, the associations will be deeply
personal. DeNora (2001) describes the case of “Lucy,” whose
hearing of the Schubert “Impromptus” brings connotations of
“comfort” because her father used to play these pieces when she
was falling asleep after dinner.
Cross (2012) notes that music appears to be “a strangely mal-
leable and flexible phenomenon” (p. 265), in that “one and the
same piece can bear quite different meanings for performer and
listener, or for two different listeners” (p. 266). Some of this so-
called floating intentionality or “aboutness” (Cross, 2012, p. 266)
is perhaps beyond systematic modeling, but may still be explored
in terms of in-depth interviews and music analysis. For exam-
ple, Delis et al. (1978) suggest that listeners construct a story in
relation to the music, in order to better remember it. Moreover,
some listeners perceive the music to reflect their own personality
(how they think and feel), thereby confirming their self-identity
(Gabrielsson and Lindström Wik, 2003). Music analyses in the
more “hermeneutic” tradition may also be concerned with asso-
ciative codings: for instance, when Hatten (1994) analyses the
Cavatina of Beethoven’s string quartet op. 130 and notes that “the
‘willed’ (basically stepwise) ascent takes on a hopeful character
supported by the stepwise bass . . . ” (p. 213, italics added), there
is no doubt that this is how Hatten hears the music; there is also
little doubt that few other listeners would hear the piece in exactly
the same way (unless, perhaps, they have read Hatten’s persuasive
interpretation).
The real powers of intrinsic and associative sources of per-
ceived emotions in music might lie in their ability to modulate
or extend the expression provided by iconically-coded sources, as
discussed in the following section.
Codings combined: multiple layers of musical expression
Figure 2 illustrates the conceptualization of musical expression
proposed in this article: there are three primary types of cod-
ing which correspond to three “layers” of musical expression of
emotions. The bottom (“core”) level is constituted by iconically-
coded basic emotions (based on vocal expression). This layer
may explain universal recognition of basic emotions, in both
vocal (Bryan and Barrett, 2008) and musical (Fritz et al., 2009)
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FIGURE 2 | Multiple-layer conceptualization of musical expression of
emotions.
expression. However, this layer can be extended, qualified, or
even modified by two additional layers in terms of intrinsic
and associative coding, enabling listeners to perceive more com-
plex emotions, which however are less cross-culturally invariant.
Intrinsically-coded expression may add dynamically changing
contours (e.g., variation in “tension,” “arousal,” or “intensity”)
which help to shape more time-dependent emotional expres-
sions (e.g., conveying “relief” may depend on changes over time).
Associative coding adds an even richer level of complex emo-
tions, although typically with a low level of cross-cultural or even
inter-individual agreement. This layer can furthermore be divided
into a more “communal” associative subsection/dimension and a
more “idiosyncratic” (or deeply personal) subsection/dimension.
The “communal” subsection involves the common associations
of a particular social group, as constituted by shared experi-
ences (group identity) or musical conventions. At the final layer
of expression, the idiosyncratic layer, a listener can perceive
just about any emotion in the music, through deeply personal
associations.
Conceived in this manner, it is easy to see how perception
of emotional expression in music might lead to both agreement
(Juslin, 1997) and disagreement (Huber, 1923); cross-cultural
similarities (Fritz et al., 2009) and differences (Gregory and
Varney, 1996); a shared meaning (Sloboda and Juslin, 2001, p. 95)
and deeply personal meaning (Gabrielsson and Lindström Wik,
2003), sometimes, perhaps, even within the same study or piece
of music. Further, one might conceive of “mixed emotions,”
resulting from different emotional meaning at different layers,
somewhat akin to what Cohen (2001) refers to as “emotional
polyphony” (p. 252).
This multiple layer notion of musical expression might
account for some previous findings. For example, Brown (1981)
studied music listeners’ ability to recognize emotions in pieces
from different styles and genres in classical music. He chose 12
musical excerpts and asked listeners, both musicians and non-
musicians, to sort them into six broad emotion categories. In a
second task, listeners were instead required to identify six pairs
out of 12 other musical excerpts representing “Variations on
Sadness” (i.e., variants within the same broad emotion category).
While listeners were quite successful in the first task, they were
not in the second task, until Brown supplied his own descrip-
tions of the six sadness categories. However, non-musicians were
still unsuccessful. Brown thus concluded that if the different
expressions are not too similar (as in the first task), the emotion
categories can be identified even by persons not highly knowl-
edgeable about classical music; however, with pieces as close in
expression as in the variations on sadness “the agreement on
synonymous pairs can only be achieved by listeners highly conver-
sant with the traditions involved” (p. 264). One may re-interpret
these results as follows: the recognition of broad basic emotion
categories was based on iconically coded expression which does
not require musical expertise; the recognition of more complex
or subtle nuances within the categories was based on associative
coding which requires some knowledge of musical conventions.
Similarly, in a recent cross-cultural study of musical expression
of emotions by Laukka et al. (2013), it was found that decod-
ing of basic emotions was rather robust regardless of whether the
music was familiar or not—presumably because it’s based on the
core layer of iconically coded expression. In contrast, decoding of
non-basic emotions was more limited as it merely occurred for
some listener groups and/or for familiar musical cultures. These
emotions were probably based to a greater extent on associative
coding (e.g., social conventions) at the third layer of expression
(see Figure 2).
The relative importance of the three layers of musical expres-
sion could vary as a function of musical genre, historical con-
text, as well as various listener characteristics. Still, I think that
iconic sources tend to be the most powerful—because associative
sources are too individual and intrinsic sources are too indeter-
minate. Hence, iconic sources, linked to basic emotions, account
for the lion’s share of musical expression. These sources have a
clear cross-cultural component due to their direct link to auto-
nomic arousal and the human voice. Consequently, it does not
appear far-fetched to assume that the so-called “psychophysical
cues” in Balkwill and Thompson’s (1999) cue redundancy model
mainly correspond to iconically-coded basic emotions that can be
cross-culturally recognized, whereas their “culture-specific cues”
partly correspond to emotions coded more in terms of associa-
tive or intrinsic sources. Similarly, a decomposition into different
types of coding might help to account for both similarities and
differences between vocal expression (e.g., Juslin and Scherer,
2005) and musical expression (Gabrielsson and Juslin, 2003):
Iconic coding of basic emotions will tend to be similar across
the two channels (Juslin and Laukka, 2003), but associative and
intrinsic sources of emotions will diverge, since their different
functions in human life will shape conventions underlying their
use differently.
THE SPECIAL CASE OF AROUSAL OF FELT EMOTIONS
So far, this paper has been concerned exclusively with expression
and perception of emotions. However, most researchers believe
that music can also arouse felt emotions in listeners under cer-
tain circumstances. This issue is not uncontroversial (Juslin and
Västfjäll, 2008), although as eloquently put by Ball (2010), “no
one can doubt that some music is capable of exciting some
emotion in some people some of the time” (p. 257). It is very
important to distinguish arousal of emotions from expression and
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perception of emotions, because the emotions involved may
be different depending on the process (Juslin and Laukka,
2004).
To be clear, the present author has never suggested that arousal
of felt emotion during music listening is limited to basic emo-
tions; quite the contrary, for over a decade I have repeatedly
observed that music arouses a wide range of emotions (Juslin and
Laukka, 2004; Juslin, 2005, 2011, 2013; Juslin and Västfjäll, 2008;
Juslin et al., 2011). The notion that basic emotions are “privi-
leged” applies only to expression and perception of emotion, not
to arousal of emotion (And even in the case of expression and
perception, I have allowed for, and examined, more “complex”
emotions; e.g., Juslin et al., 2004). Despite this, it’s not uncom-
mon for scholars to give the impression that my position is, or
has been, that music arouses only basic emotions. Again, it is
helpful to consider the actual findings of relevance to the issue
at hand.
Survey studies of the prevalence of musical emotions suggest
that music arouses quite a wide range of states. Among the most
frequently reported emotions to date are the following broad
categories: Calm-relaxation, happiness-joy, nostalgia-longing,
interest-expectancy, pleasure-enjoyment, sadness-melancholy,
arousal-energy, love-tenderness, pride-confidence as well as various
synonymous terms (Wells and Hakanen, 1991; Sloboda, 1992;
Juslin and Laukka, 2004; Juslin et al., 2008, 2011; Zentner et al.,
2008). “Mixed” emotions (e.g., both joy and sadness) also occur—
but in a minority of the events (13% in Gabrielsson, 2010; 11%
in Juslin et al., 2011).
Hence, previous findings indicate that the emotions aroused
by music include basic emotions, but also include many other
emotions, depending on which underlying mechanism caused
the emotion (see Juslin, 2013, for further discussion). Even
the supposedly “music-specific” scale for measuring emotional
reactions to music, GEMS (e.g., Zentner et al., 2008), includes
basic emotions (e.g., sad → SADNESS; irritated → TENSION;
in love → TENDERNESS; joyful → JOYFUL ACTIVATION).
Thus, Lamont and Eerola (2011) suggest that GEMS “con-
tains significant redundancy in comparison to traditional mod-
els” (p. 142). We need to identify the real points of agree-
ment and disagreement: researchers agree that music arouses a
wide range of emotions that go beyond basic emotions. They
agree that music arouses more positive than negative emotions.
They do not agree, however, that there exist unique emotions
aroused when and only when people listen to music (Juslin,
2013).
CONCLUSION: ENDING THE BASIC-EMOTION BASHING
Let us return to the main question posed at the outset of this
article: What does music express? Or, formulated more precisely:
What are the emotional contents that listeners may perceive in
music? As noted at the beginning, the question may have dif-
ferent answers depending on how we operationalize the notion
of expression: Is it sufficient that any single listener perceives an
emotion? Or should there be a minimum level of listener agree-
ment? Or should the perceived emotion correspond to what the
composer intended?
These various senses in which music can be said to express
emotions are largely integrated in the present approach, which
may be summarized as follows: There are three distinct layers
of perceived musical expression of emotions. Each layer cor-
responds to a specific type of coding of emotional meaning.
The “core” layer is constituted by iconically-coded basic emo-
tions that can explain recent findings of universal recognition
of basic emotions in vocal expression and music. The “core”
layer can be extended, qualified and sometimes even modified
by additional layers in terms of intrinsic and associative cod-
ing, which enable listeners to perceive complex emotions. These
additional layers of expression are less cross-culturally invari-
ant, though, and more dependent on the social context and/or
the individual listener. At the “core” level of basic emotions,
vocal and musical expression are fairly similar. At the addi-
tional layers that involve more complex emotions, vocal and
musical expression begin to diverge from one another, due to
the unique functions and uses associated with each modality.
Depending on how expression is coded in particular pieces of
music, we may expect to find different results across empirical
investigations. Hence, I have argued that one might easily obtain
evidence of either cross-cultural invariance or diversity, simply
depending on how one is selecting the music in studies (Juslin,
2012).
Research to date has primarily focused on iconically-coded
expression of emotions in music. It would thus be interest-
ing to explore in future studies how associative and intrinsic
sources contribute to expression, beyond basic emotions pro-
duced by iconically-coded sources. Still, while there is more to
expression in music that basic emotions, as I have tried to show,
basic emotions remain at the core of the process, and cannot
be ignored. An approach that focuses only on basic emotions
presents an incomplete picture (see Figure 2), while an approach
that ignores basic emotions is plainly inadequate. Recent cri-
tiques of the basic-emotion approach in the music field have
been marked by myths and misunderstandings (or by hidden
agendas). Empirical data, in contrast, illustrate the value of the
concept of basic emotions in accounting for musical expres-
sion of emotions (section A Positive Explanatory Role of Basic
Emotions).
Hence, in closing this essay, I would like to call for an
end to the “basic-emotion bashing,” in an attempt to offer
a more nuanced view. As I have tried to show, a distinction
between basic and complex emotions, and its link to various
types of coding, can help to account for several findings con-
cerning musical expression of emotions. The basic emotions
represent the crucial link between our ancient past and modern
music making, and are part of the reason that music is some-
times, perhaps justifiably so, called a universal language of the
emotions.
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